Performance of an Existing Obligation as Consideration for a Promise by Waite, John B.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1918
Performance of an Existing Obligation as
Consideration for a Promise
John B. Waite
University of Michigan Law School
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/903
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Courts Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository.
For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Waite, John B. "Performance of an Existing Obligation as Consideration for a Promise." Mich. L. Rev. 16, no. 3 (1918): 182-4.
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
PERFORMANCE OV AN EXISTING OBLIGATION AS CONSIDERATION ]OR A PROM-
ist.-The dictum that if there be nothing in a rule flatly contradictory to
reason the law will presume it to be well founded, and that the office of the
judge is "jus dicere and not jus dare", is responsible for much agony of con-
struction and tortious logic on the part of courts torn by'desire to evade it
in the interest of moderi ideas of right. There is a trilogy of accepted legal
principles which it has been particularly difficult for the courts to adhere
to in spirit or to repudiate in letter. They are the propositions, that for a
promise to be enforcible a consideration must emanate from the promisee,
that doing what one is already legally bound to do is not a consideration, and
that one is legally bound to perform a contract according to its terms. In
other words, doing what one has already contracted to do is not consideration
for a prorhise made on condition or in contemplation of such performance.
Under this rule, if A. has contracted to do something for B., his actual per-
formance of that promise can not be consideration for a new pormise by B.
or a collateral promise by C. There is no lack of real application of the rule.
Stilk v. Myrich, 2 Camp. 317; Frazer v. Hatton, 2 C. B. N. S. 512; Harris v.
Carter, 3 E. & B. 559; Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 26o; Seybolt v.
N. Y., L. E. etc. R. R., 95 N. Y. 562; Village of Seneca Falls v. Botsch, i49
N. Y. Supp. 32o; Ayers v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 52 Iowa 478; Conover v.
Stillwell, 34 N. J. L. 54; Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328; Vance v. Ellison,
76 W. Va. 592; Muir v. Morris, 8o Ore. 378; Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 9I N.
Y. 392; McDevit v. Stokes, 174 Ky. 515.
But while courts feel constrained to follow the rule, they have not been
hesitant in condemning it as unsuited to modern ideas. They "have rarely
failed, upon any recurrence of the question, to criticise and condemn its
reasonableness, justice, fairness or honesty". Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164.
So also Mr. Ames, 12 HARV. L. Rzv. 515, 521; Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas.
6o5; Harper v. Graham, 20 Oh. io6. One court, at least, "profoundly and pain-
fully impressed with the slavish adherence of the legal and judicial mind to
precedent, or, in many cases, to what seems to be precedent only", flatly
denied, so far as payment of money is concerned, that doing what one is
legally bound to do is not consideration. Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in revolt against imitation of the past as the basis of
modern law, evades the rule, unofficially, by denying that one is legally bound
to perform a contract according to its terms. IO HARv. L. R.v. 457, 462;
THZ CoMMoN LAW, pp. 300 ff. The court in Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358,
takes the same view officially.
These, however, are unusual instances. Other courts, while they evince
willingness to escape application of the rule, recognize its existence and bind-
ing force, and evade it only when they can do so on some plausible distinc-
tion or more or less specious assumption. Thus, a number of cases hold the
making of the new promise to be sufficient evidence of mutual rescission of
the first contract. On this assumption, the original contractor is no longer
bound by that agreement and his doing what he had originally promised, or
promising a second time to do it, is of course a consideration for the con-
tractee's new promise. Stewart v. Keteltas, 36 N. Y. 388; Linz v. Schuck,
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io6 Md. 220; Agel v. Patch Mfg. Co., 77 Vt. 13; Thomas v. Barnes, 156
Mass. 58i. Sometimes, without denying that a contractor is legally bound to
perform according to the terms of the contract, courts, paradoxically, hold
that his actual performance instead of mere payment of damages for non-
performance is a consideration for the new promise. Lattimore v. Harsen,
14 Johns. (N. Y.) 330; Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489; Bishop v. Busse, 69
Ill. 403. Other courts say that performing according to existing contract in-
stead of exercising an opprtunity to go into bankruptcy is consideration for
the new promise. Melroy v. Kemmerer, 218 Pa. 381; Engbretson v. Seiber-
Hng, 122 Iowa 522. But on the whole, American courts adhere to the prin-
ciples established. Even the courts which evade their application make as-
sumption, as pointed out, that the prior obligation has been rescinded, or
otherwise escape from taking the position that there is no legal obligation
to perform a contract according to its terms.
The extra cog in the wheels of logic by which consideration is explained
is the case of Shadwell v. Shadwell, 3o L. J. C. P. 145, and the English doc-
trine based upon it. In that case the performance by one person of what
he was already under contract to do, was held to be consideration for a
third person's promise to him. Every writer who has not ignored this case
has taken his turn at condemning, harmonising or explaining the decision
according to his own ideas. No one has succeeded in making it harmonise
with both principles, that doing what one is already legally bound to do is
not consideration, and that one is legally bound to perform a contract accord-
ing to its terms. But this is an English case and the trilogy of principles was
saved in this country by the fact, to quote Mr. Williston, that "the almost uni-
form current of authority in this country is that neither performance nor
promise of performance of what one is already bound to do by contract with
a third person, is a sufficient consideration to support a promise."
The Court of Appeals of New York, however, has just dammed this current
of authority by its decision in the case of Cicco v. Schweizer, handed down
November 13, 1917, Daily Record (Syracuse) Dec. 10, 1917. It appears from
the case, that in 10o2 one Count Oberto Gulinelli was engaged to marry
Schweizer's daughter. Four days before the marriage was to take place
Schweizer promised in writing to pay to the daughter the sum of $2,5oo an-
nually while both he and she should live. The daughter and her husband
assigned this promise to the plaintiff who sued for the installment for the
year 1912, which Schweizer had refused to pay. The written agreement
reads, "Whereas, Miss Blanche Josephine Schweizer, * * * is now affianced
to and is to be married to the above said Count Oberto Giacomo Giovanni
Francesco Maria Gulinelli, now, in consideration of all that is herein set
forth the said Mr. Joseph Schweizer promises and expressly agrees by the
present contract to pay" the sum named. From statements of the court it
appears that the promise was made to the Count only, although, the court
says, it was intended for the benefit of the daughter and she might have
sued upon it. There is nowhere in the agreement any indication that the en-
gagement between the daughter and her count had been broken or was
about to be rescinded, and the court explicitly states that neither of the parties
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to the marriage promised the father anything. The court seems to say that
the consideration was the fact that the parties to the existing marriage con-
tract did not mutually rescind it. Had the promise run to boh of them the
differentiation from Shadwell v. Shadwell might have been well taken. But
it ran to the Count alone. The daughter was not a party to the father's
agreement, and that she should refrain from acquiescing in a dissolution of
her agreement with the Count was a condition, not a consideration. To hold
the act of a third person, to whom no promise has been made, to be a con-
sideration would be entirely out of harmony with the idea of reciprocation
between the promise and the consideration, the idea of "exchange" of promises
or of a promise for an act that is found in every definition of consideration.
There is no authority prior to the principal case for disregarding the necessity
of reciprocation. The sole consideration, therefor, was the performance by
the Count of the contract of marriage by which he was already bound at the
time of the defendant's promise. The court holds that the parties married not
because they had agreed to do so, but because the father had promised to
give the daughter $2,500 per year if they should do so.
This comes perilously close to giving the doctrine of Shadwell v. Shadwell
American authority, and it does drop an obstruction in the course of our logic.
While the decision stands as sound, either the happening of an event extrane-
ous to the promisee's volition may be a consideration, or one is not legally
bound to perform an existing contract, -or doing what one is already legally
bound to do may be consideration for a new promise. Either our established
notions of consideration as something within the promisee's volition and
emanating from him are upset by the case, or it is fresh authority for the
proposition that any act of the promisee induced by the promise, and intended
to be so induced, is consideration for the promise. 14 MICH. L. Rxv. 57o.
J. B. W.
